Family Governance in Gulf Family Groups, 2026: Councils, Charters and the Board
Gulf law now gives family groups councils and charters. This report asks where they collide with the board on the chief executive and the dividend.
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A standing brief on the executive search and leadership market across the Gulf.
- The Gulf now gives families statutory tools for governance: Dubai Law No. 9 of 2020, UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 37 of 2022 and the family charter provisions of Saudi Arabia's Companies Law of 2022.
- In the sources reviewed, these tools are designed for private family companies, so a listed family group has a council and a charter only if it has written its own.
- JOH Partners' reading of its own chair, board and chief executive mandates is that the family council and the board collide on the appointment of the chief executive, the dividend and the flow of information, because the same few people sit in every room.
- The report closes with five steps a chair can take before the next generation arrives, and the PDF edition adds a worked example, a comparison with UK guidance and a ten-question self-test.
Family governance is the set of rules a business-owning family writes for itself: who may own shares, who may work in the company, how the family reaches a view and how it speaks to the board. The Gulf now gives families statutory tools for this, in Dubai Law No. 9 of 2020, UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 37 of 2022 and the family charter provisions of Saudi Arabia's Companies Law of 2022. This report, the twenty-third in JOH Partners' Gulf leadership series, reviews what those frameworks enable and what they leave open. It then sets out JOH's reading, drawn from its own chair, board and chief executive mandates, of how family councils and charters work beside the board in family groups, where the two collide on the appointment of the chief executive and the dividend, and what a chair should put in place before the next generation arrives. It builds on the earlier research on succession and chairs, and on the report on nomination committees that came before it.
47 of 60. GCC family-controlled listed companies in JOH's earlier corpus that expect a succession event at chief executive or chair level within five years
JOH Partners, The Succession Gap, edition 2 of this series.
14 of 60. Companies in the same corpus with a documented internal successor whose name the board could give, with the candidate's awareness
JOH Partners, The Succession Gap, edition 2 of this series.
15 years. The longest term of a family ownership contract under Dubai Law No. 9 of 2020, renewable by agreement of all the parties
Dubai Government Media Office, 19 August 2020.
What family governance is meant to do
A family that owns a company is doing three jobs at once. It owns the shares, it sits on or chooses the board, and some of its members work in the business. Each job has different questions. Ownership asks who may hold shares, how they can be sold and what the family wants from its investment. The board asks who should direct the company and who should run it. The business asks who is qualified to work there and how well they are doing.
Left alone, these questions get mixed up. A brother who is a poor manager is kept on because he is a shareholder. A strong chief executive is held back because she is not family. A dividend is cut to fund a project because the managing director wants it, and the family branch that needs the income is not asked. None of this is malicious. It is what happens when one conversation covers everything.
Family governance is the answer to that. It usually has three parts. The first is a forum where the family can meet, argue and reach a view without the company's directors in the room; this is called a family assembly or a family council, depending on its size and powers. The second is a written document, a charter or a constitution, in which the family sets down its rules on ownership, employment, dividends and disputes. The third is a clear line between the family's forum and the company's board, so that each knows what the other decides.
JOH's research on the chairs of Gulf-listed family businesses showed how much of a chair's authority in these groups rests on informal understandings. A council and a charter are the way to write those understandings down.
What the Gulf frameworks now enable
The Gulf has moved faster than most regions in giving families something to put in writing. Three sets of rules matter, and a fourth guide sits beside them.
What the Gulf family business frameworks provide
| Framework | Who it covers | What it enables | What it leaves open |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dubai Law No. 9 of 2020, as reported by the Dubai Government Media Office | Optional for existing and new family ownerships; excludes family ownership in public joint stock companies | A notarised family ownership contract for up to 15 years, renewable; sets each member's share and can regulate the board and management powers | Not stated on the page reviewed: a family council, inheritance rules, valuation or disputes |
| UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 37 of 2022, as summarised by Al Tamimi and Charles Russell Speechlys | Family companies registered in a unified register, with a majority of shares held by one family; excludes public joint stock companies and general partnerships | Family constitutions, a family assembly, council or office; share classes; pre-emption on transfers; a buy-back of up to 30 per cent; dispute routes through free zone courts, arbitration or a committee | Exact commencement and register procedure not confirmed from the sources; regulations on share classes to follow |
| Saudi Companies Law 2022, as reported by Arab News | Companies generally, as reported | A binding family charter or agreement, which may form part of the articles but may not breach the law, covering governance, work policy, profit distribution, share disposal and disputes | A family council is not described in the sources reviewed |
| Saudi Ministry of Commerce Guiding Charter, 2018, as summarised by Al Tamimi | Family-owned closed joint stock companies; not binding | Model terms: a family board for larger families, a three-stage dispute process, a 30-day priority right on a sale, rules for family employment | Listed companies are under Capital Market Authority rules instead |
Two points stand out. The first is that the tools differ in kind. Dubai's law is built around a contract between family members that holds their shares together. The UAE federal law creates a registered company form with built-in rules on transfers and exit. Saudi Arabia's law lets a family make a charter binding by writing it into the company's articles, and the Ministry's older guide offers model terms. The common thread is that each gives a family legal force for what it writes.
The second point matters more for the groups in JOH's work. Dubai Law No. 9 excludes family ownership in public joint stock companies, and the federal decree-law excludes public joint stock companies and general partnerships. The Saudi guide is aimed at closed joint stock companies, with listed companies left to the Capital Market Authority. In the sources reviewed, the statutory family tools are designed for private family companies. The family groups that are listed, which are the ones in the corpus behind editions 2 and 3, have the benefit of a charter and a council only to the extent that they have written one themselves. JOH has not found a rule in the listed-company codes it has reviewed for this series that requires or describes a family council.
Councils and charters in practice
A family council is, at its best, a small group chosen by the family to speak for it. It meets on a set timetable, usually a few times a year. It decides things the family should decide: who may buy shares, what the family expects as income, how members are brought into the business and what happens when they disagree. The Saudi Ministry's guide suggests a family board for a family of more than twelve members, with no more than six members, three-year terms and at least four meetings a year, and it asks that those members not also sit on the company board or hold executive roles. That is a model, not a rule, but it shows how the separation is meant to work.
A charter is the written record. A useful one is short. It says who counts as family for ownership purposes, how shares can be transferred and to whom, what a family member must have achieved before working in the business, how the family elects its representatives to the board, how much of the profit is paid out and how disputes are settled. The Ministry's guide describes a three-stage dispute process: a private discussion, then a conciliation body that includes non-family members, then arbitration or the courts. Where a charter exists, the point of it is that the hard decisions have been taken once, in calm, and need not be taken again in a crisis.
JOH's observation is that many Gulf family groups have the first half of this and not the second. A family has a council in everything but name: the elder brothers, an uncle, perhaps the founder's widow, meet before any large decision. But what the council decides is not written down, and its authority rests on the standing of the people in it. JOH's report on Gulf family office leadership found that only around a third of the family offices the firm works with had a formal governance framework, board or family constitution in place. The same gap shows up in operating groups. The family has habits, and the habits work until the person who enforces them is gone.
Obediah Ayton, in his conversation on family office leadership in the UAE, says that access to family offices is built through consistency and trust and not through pitches. That is how many families run their own affairs too. Trust holds a family together while the founder is there. A charter is what holds it together when the founder is not.
Where the council and the board collide
A council and a board are meant to do different things. In JOH's observation, they collide in three places, and each is about the same issue: who decides.
The first is the appointment of the chief executive. The board appoints, in law and in nearly every charter. But in a family group, the view of the family is usually settled before the board meets. If the council has a candidate in mind, the board that meets to consider the question is considering a name it has already been given. JOH's report on nomination committees in the Gulf set out why the committee often confirms what the owner has decided. A family council that has a written role in the process, for example to set the family's criteria and to be consulted on the shortlist, is a more honest version of what is already happening.
The second is the dividend. A family branch that depends on dividends for income has a direct interest in how much the company pays. A chief executive who wants to fund growth has a direct interest in paying less. The board is supposed to settle this by balancing the company's needs against the shareholders'. In a family group the argument usually happens in the council, in private, and the board hears the result as a recommendation. A written dividend policy, agreed for three years at a time, takes the argument out of every board meeting.
The third is information. A board member who is also a council member hears things in one forum that the other does not. A family director may know that a branch plans to sell shares, that two cousins have fallen out or that the founder is unwell. That knowledge shapes what the director says in the boardroom, and the independent directors, who do not have it, may not understand why the debate is going the way it is. A charter that says what the council shares with the board, and what it keeps within the family, protects both sides.
A family council decides what the family wants. A board decides what is right for the company. Trouble starts when the same four people hold both meetings and nobody says which one this is.
The same few people in every room
The statutory tools assume the family, the board and management are different groups of people. In JOH's observation, in most Gulf family groups they are not. The same four or five people sit on the family council, hold the family's places on the board and run the main businesses. A decision is taken in one room, repeated in a second and recorded in a third.
That overlap has a cost that is easy to miss. Where the same person speaks for the family, votes at the board and runs the business, nobody is positioned to say no. There is no one whose job is to ask the chief executive whether the family's preferred plan is good for the company. JOH's research on independent directors on Gulf boards looked at how the independent minority copes with this. The independents can ask, but they are a minority by design, and their influence depends on how the family treats them.
JOH's perspective on CEO succession in a GCC family business makes a related point: the hardest succession is the one where the family, the board and the candidate all know the answer in advance and no one has tested it. The earlier succession research gives the scale. In JOH's corpus of sixty family-controlled listed companies, forty-seven expected a succession event at chief executive or chair level within five years, and only fourteen had a documented internal successor whose name the board could give, with the candidate's awareness. A family with a council that meets only when someone is ill has not given itself the time to prepare.
When the family steps back from the chief executive role
Some families solve the overlap by putting a non-family chief executive in charge. It can work well. JOH's engagement placing the first non-family chief executive into a $3 billion Saudi industrial group is an example: the chief executive signed within 11 weeks and was in the role at 18 months.
The point for this report is what makes that sort of appointment hold. A non-family chief executive needs a clear answer to three questions before taking the role. What does the family decide, and what does the chief executive decide? How will the family's view reach the chief executive: through the chair, through the council or in the corridor? And what happens when the family disagrees with the chief executive, and who has the last word? A charter and a council that have answered those questions in writing make the role possible. Where they have not, a capable outside executive can find themselves answerable to half a dozen relatives who disagree with each other.
What a chair should put in place before the next generation arrives
The chair of a family group is in an awkward position. They are often family, they are often senior, and the work needed is partly about their own authority. But the chair is also the person best placed to start it, and a few steps do not need a change to the articles.
The first is to write the charter before it is needed. A charter drafted in a quiet year, with the family's own advisers, is far easier to agree than one drafted after a death or a dispute. It need not be long. A dozen pages that settle ownership, employment, dividends, representation and disputes is enough to begin with.
The second is to give the council and the board separate agendas and separate meetings. A family that meets in the same room, with the same papers, for both purposes should split them, even if the same people attend. The council deals with what the family wants. The board deals with the company. The minutes should show which was which.
The third is to write down how the chief executive is chosen. The charter should say what part the family plays, what part the nomination committee plays and what the board decides. The chair should keep a standing succession file for the chief executive and the chair, with internal and external names, and review it each year with the council and the board. JOH's perspective on board refreshment and the five-year mix explains how to build the independent side of this.
The fourth is to agree a dividend policy for three years at a time, in writing, so that the question is settled once and not argued each spring.
The fifth is to put at least one respected non-family director on the board with the standing to say no, and to make clear to the family that the director's job is to protect the company over the long term, which also protects the family's wealth.
A family charter is not a sign that the family does not trust each other. It is what lets the next generation start with a plan instead of a quarrel.
A forward view
Three developments will shape the next twelve months. The first is the effect of the statutory tools as families begin to use them. One law-firm summary of the UAE federal law, written when it was issued, called it untested in practice, and said its regulations on share classes were still to follow. How it has been used since is a gap in this review, and the first disputes decided under it will say a good deal about how strong a family constitution really is. The second is the generational handover. JOH's succession research found that more than half of the eighteen chairs interviewed described next-generation members who had chosen careers outside the family group, which makes the question of who may work in the company, and on what terms, more pressing. The third is the pressure from outside investors, lenders and regulators on listed family groups to show how they govern the family's influence, and a council and charter are the answer that costs least.
Beyond the rules, the change JOH expects to see in its mandates is that more families ask a search firm to help them separate the roles before a crisis, and not after. JOH's group holdings sector page sets out where the firm sees these structures most often. Boards that want a continuing read on the executive layer beneath the family, so that the succession file rests on current evidence, can use platforms such as Board Pulse to keep it up to date.
Methodology and evidence base
This report is built from public sources and JOH Partners' qualitative reading of its own chair, board and chief executive mandates since 2014. The public layer is the Dubai Government Media Office's account of Dubai Law No. 9 of 2020 (issued 19 August 2020); Al Tamimi and Charles Russell Speechlys summaries of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 37 of 2022 on family companies; Al Tamimi's summary of the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Investment's Guiding Charter for Family Owned Businesses of 2018, with the Ministry's own press release; and an Arab News report of July 2022 on the family charter provisions of the Saudi Companies Law. The JOH layer is directional observation, labelled as such. Where the report restates figures, they come from JOH's published research on succession and chairs (editions 2 and 3), which is built on a corpus of sixty GCC family-controlled listed companies and eighteen structured chair interviews in the fourth quarter of 2025, and from the report on Gulf family office leadership (edition 8). This report adds no new count from that corpus, because the corpus does not record family council, charter or constitution variables.
The report has not reviewed the charter, constitution or minutes of any particular family and does not claim to measure how many Gulf family groups operate in any one way. Several sources are secondary summaries, the Dubai and UAE provisions were read through press and law-firm accounts and not the Official Gazette text, the Saudi Companies Law was read through a press report, and the Saudi guide dates from 2018. The Dubai Government Media Office page does not state a family council, valuation or dispute provisions, and the report does not infer them. A family should read the current primary text for its own jurisdiction and take legal advice before relying on any detail here. The worked example in the PDF edition is a composite, not an account of a specific engagement. Nothing here is legal advice. JOH Partners does not hold a proprietary dataset on family councils or charters, and no dataset block is attached to this report.
Key takeaways
JOH Partners is an executive search and senior executive recruitment firm advising chairs, family councils and family groups on board, chair and chief executive appointments across the GCC, the UK and Singapore. For the full report, download the PDF above, then request a Board Pulse demo for continuing visibility of your executive layer, or engage a partner for a confidential conversation about how your family council and board work together today.
Oliver Helvin
Founder and Managing Director
Oliver Helvin is the Founder and Managing Director of JOH Partners, based in the Middle East. With over 20 years of experience in multinational corporations across Europe and the Middle East, he has held pivotal roles at Gulftainer, Al Futtaim, BP and AstraZeneca, where he led recruitment functions and built the policies, processes and KPIs that drove change and efficiency in each organisation he served. He founded JOH Partners in 2014 to deliver retained executive search the way it should be done: partner-led, research-rigorous and accountable for retention twenty-four months after the hire.
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Questions about this research.
What is family governance in a Gulf family business?
Family governance is the set of rules a business-owning family writes for itself: who may own shares, who may work in the company, how the family reaches a view and how it speaks to the board. It usually has three parts: a forum such as a family council or assembly, a written charter or constitution, and a clear line between the family's forum and the company's board.
Do Gulf laws give families a legal basis for a family council or charter?
In part. Dubai Law No. 9 of 2020 provides for a notarised family ownership contract, UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 37 of 2022 allows family constitutions and a family assembly or council in registered family companies, and Saudi Arabia's Companies Law of 2022 is reported to allow a binding family charter. In the sources reviewed these tools are designed for private family companies, and families should read the current text and take local advice.
Do the Gulf family business laws apply to listed family companies?
In the sources reviewed, mostly not. Dubai Law No. 9 excludes family ownership in public joint stock companies, the UAE federal decree-law excludes public joint stock companies and general partnerships, and the Saudi Ministry guide is aimed at closed joint stock companies. A listed family group can still write its own charter and council, but the statute does not do it for them.
Where do a family council and a board of directors usually collide?
In JOH Partners' observation they collide in three places: the appointment of the chief executive, the dividend and the flow of information. The family usually settles its view before the board meets, a dividend affects family income directly, and a director who sits on both bodies knows things the independents do not.
What should a chair put in place before the next generation arrives?
Five steps that need no change to the articles: write a short charter before it is needed, give the council and the board separate agendas, write down how the chief executive is chosen, agree a dividend policy for three years in writing, and add a respected non-family director with the standing to say no.
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