Executive Pay Benchmarking: How Gulf Boards Choose a Peer Group
Executive pay benchmarking looks like a fact but rests on choices: the peer group, the age of the data and the percentile. How Gulf boards should choose.
Subscribe to our newsletter
A standing brief on the executive search and leadership market across the Gulf.
Executive pay benchmarking is the step in which a board compares what it pays its senior executives with what comparable companies pay, so that it can set a level it is able to defend. In the Gulf the comparison is often treated as a fact delivered by an adviser. It is better understood as three choices: which companies count as peers, how old and how complete the data is, and which point in the range the board decides to target. If the peer group is wrong, every number that follows carries the error. If the board aims at the upper quartile every year, the market moves up whether or not performance does. This piece sets out how a remuneration committee can make each of those choices on purpose.
What executive pay benchmarking actually gives a board
A benchmark gives a board a range, not an answer. A reward adviser takes a set of companies, collects what they pay for roles of similar size, and reports where the company's own pay sits against them, usually at the lower quartile, the median and the upper quartile. The committee then decides where in that range it wants to be.
Each step involves a judgement that the final report tends to hide. Someone chose the companies. The data was collected at some point in the past, and it covers some parts of the package and not others. The decision to aim at the median, or above it, belongs to the committee, although it is often presented as the market's. None of this makes benchmarking wrong. It means the committee should know what it is looking at before it relies on it.
JOH Partners' Gulf Executive Reward Report 2026 puts the central point plainly: there is no single Gulf benchmark. A board must know which comparator set is relevant to its ownership, sector and listing status before it can judge whether a package is competitive. That is a statement about peer groups, and the peer group is where most of the error starts.
This piece is about how the reference point is built. Who on the board should decide pay, and how a committee earns that authority, is the subject of JOH's perspective on the remuneration committee and who sets executive pay. How a Gulf package compares with London and Singapore once tax and deferral are counted is the subject of JOH's market note on senior executive pay across the Gulf, London and Singapore.
Choosing the peer group: who does the company really compete with?
A peer group should be the set of companies the business would realistically hire from and lose people to. That sounds obvious. In practice it is the choice boards most often get wrong, and in JOH's observation the mistake usually takes one of three forms.
The first is borrowing a peer group from another ownership type. A listed group benchmarks against sovereign-anchored platforms because they are the most visible employers in the market, or because a candidate it wants has come from one. JOH's 2026 Gulf Operator-CEO Index found that sovereign-anchored platforms in group holdings and industrials run cash bases roughly fifteen to twenty percent above the comparable listed bands. A listed group that adopts the sovereign-anchored range as its market has raised its reference point by that much before it has looked at a single role.
The same tier, two different reference points
| Revenue tier | Group holdings, listed (USD k) | Group holdings, sovereign-anchored (USD k) |
|---|---|---|
| Under $500M | 360 to 540 | 420 to 620 |
| $500M to $2B | 480 to 760 | 560 to 880 |
| Over $2B | 640 to 1,000 | 760 to 1,200 |
The second is borrowing a peer group from a different size of company. A business with revenue under five hundred million dollars benchmarks against groups several times its size, because those are the names the chair knows and the ones in the newspaper. The bands in the index rise clearly with revenue tier, so the mismatch shows up directly in the number.
The third is borrowing a peer group from another market. A board that wants to attract an executive from London or New York builds its comparison from listed companies there, then reads their pay against a Gulf package without adjusting for tax, deferral and the share of pay delivered in equity. For a single cross-border hire, that comparison can be legitimate. As the standing peer group for a whole executive team, it imports a pay structure the company does not have.
Size of the group matters too. In a small listed market there may be only a handful of genuine comparators in any one sector, and a committee is tempted to widen the group until it looks statistically respectable. Every company added for numbers rather than fit moves the range. A short list of real competitors, read with judgement, is usually more honest than a long list of near misses.
How old is the data, and what does it cover?
Survey data describes the past. By the time a published survey reaches a remuneration committee, it reflects pay decisions made months earlier, and in a senior market moving as quickly as the Gulf's, that gap matters. JOH's Operator-CEO Index gives an example from technology. In 2022 and 2023, technology platform chief executives were running materially higher cash bases, driven by the global competition for technology talent at the time. By 2026 those bands had normalised toward the regional cross-sector mean. A committee still working from a peer set and data of that vintage would have overstated the market for its technology leaders.
The second question is what the data covers. In the Gulf, the part of the package that is reliably comparable is cash. JOH's reward report restates Aon's analysis of 100 listed GCC companies over 2016 to 2025, which found cash-based pay at roughly 85 to 95 per cent of total executive remuneration. The same report notes that at the listed and IPO-bound end of the market the mix is moving toward a target annual bonus of around 50% of base and long-term incentives of around 100% of base, a roughly 40/20/40 split of base, bonus and long-term incentive. A company moving toward that structure that still benchmarks base salary alone is comparing one part of its future package with the whole of another company's present one.
The report is also open about a gap. No clean public source sets out pay by role and by ownership type, listed, sovereign and family, in one place. That detail sits in paywalled consultancy surveys. A committee should therefore ask which survey its adviser is using, which companies are in it, and when the data was collected. The executive on the other side of the table will be doing the same sums, and a committee that wants to see the arithmetic from that side can look at how a full senior package is turned into one comparable figure before it decides which parts of its own package to benchmark.
A benchmark tells a board what other companies chose to pay. It does not tell the board what this job is worth to this company.
The upper quartile, and where the ratchet starts
Once the range is in front of it, the committee picks a point. Few boards like to say they pay below the median, and many say they must pay above it to attract the people they want. In JOH's observation the upper quartile is the most common target among Gulf groups preparing for a listing or competing for an international hire.
The problem is arithmetic. If most companies in a peer group aim above the middle of the group, the middle moves up at the next survey, and the companies that aimed above it find themselves back at the median. So they aim higher again. Pay rises across the whole group without any change in what the executives deliver. This is the ratchet, and it starts with a choice each committee makes for reasons that look sensible on their own.
Saudi Arabia's Capital Market Authority names the risk in its Corporate Governance Regulations. A listed company's remuneration policy is to "take into consideration the practices of other companies in respect of the determination of remunerations" and to "avoid the disadvantages of such comparisons in leading to unjustifiable increases in remunerations and compensations." The regulation does not tell a committee where to aim. It tells the committee that the comparison itself can cause the increase.
A committee can resist the ratchet without underpaying anyone. It can set the median as the default for most roles and reserve a higher point for the one or two roles where the market is genuinely short of people, and say why in writing. It can put any premium in the variable part of the package, so that the extra is paid only if results follow. And it can look at the trend in its own executive pay over several years beside the trend in the company's results, which a single year's benchmark never shows.
A composite: the peer group nobody chose
This is a composite of situations JOH has seen, with the details changed. It is not a client case.
A family group with revenue of around a billion dollars is two years from a planned listing. The board asks a reward adviser to benchmark the executive committee. The adviser builds a peer group of eighteen companies: the listed groups on the same exchange, several sovereign-anchored platforms in neighbouring sectors, and four regional subsidiaries of international companies that the chief executive suggested because two of his direct reports had joined from them.
The report shows the group paying below the median for most roles. Management recommends moving every executive to the upper quartile before the listing, and the committee agrees.
Eighteen months later a newly appointed independent director asks a plain question. Of the eighteen companies, which has the group actually hired from, or lost anyone to, in the past five years? The answer is three. The sovereign-anchored platforms had set the top of the range, and the international subsidiaries paid in a structure the group did not use. Measured against its three real competitors, the group had been paying at about the median before the increase. It was now well above it, with no change to the bonus or long-term plan that might have tied the extra cost to results.
Nothing in the process was dishonest. Each company in the peer group had a reason to be there. Nobody had asked whether they were the right reasons.
The most useful question about a peer group is where the company really hires from and loses people to. If the honest answer is three companies, a list of eighteen is not helping the board.
What a remuneration committee should ask before it accepts a benchmark
JOH's research on who sets executive pay in the Gulf found that one of the four things a functioning remuneration committee holds is benchmarking it has commissioned or reviewed independently of management, rather than a single management-supplied comparator set presented as the only evidence available. Independence is the start. A committee also needs to test what it has been given.
It can begin with the list itself. Who proposed each company, and what would make it leave the list? If the committee cannot say in a sentence why a company is a peer, it probably is not one. It can then check fit: ownership type, listing status, sector and size, in that order, because ownership and listing status move the range most in the Gulf.
The next questions are about the data. When was it collected, and has anything in the market changed since? Which parts of the package does it cover, and do they match the parts the committee is setting? A base-salary benchmark is a poor guide to a package in which half the value is meant to sit in bonus and long-term incentive.
Then comes the point in the range. Where is the board aiming, for which roles, and why? The answer should be written down before the numbers are discussed, so that the target is a policy and not a reaction to the report.
One distinction is worth keeping clear. The peer group used to decide the level of pay is not the same as the one used to measure relative returns in a long-term plan. The two answer different questions, and JOH's perspective on total shareholder return in Gulf executive pay explains why the second needs its own rules. The same discipline applies to the board's own fees: JOH's research on board pay in the Gulf recommends benchmarking against the specific jurisdiction and comparable company set rather than a single regional average.
Where the benchmark ends and the board's judgement begins
A benchmark is an input. The committee still has to decide what the role is worth to this company: the scope, the difficulty of the next three years, the strength of the internal successor, and what it would cost to get the appointment wrong. Some appointments have no peer group that fits. A first non-family chief executive, a newly created group role or a leader brought in to prepare a listing is doing a job the market data does not describe well. JOH's work placing the first non-family chief executive into a three-billion-dollar Saudi industrial group is an example of an appointment where the offer had to price the change the role represented, not only a figure read from a survey.
Sandrine Bardot, in her conversation on personalising rewards for the Middle East workforce, makes the point that fairness in pay is not the same as equality, and that data-driven reward design has to be balanced against the culture of the organisation. A benchmark is the data half of that balance. The other half is the board's own view of the people it needs and the company it is building.
That view is easier to hold when the committee can see its executive layer between pay reviews. Board Pulse, JOH's leadership-intelligence platform, gives chairs and remuneration committees a continuing read on engagement and retention risk among the executives they pay, which is the one test a benchmark cannot run: whether the people the company most needs are staying. The multi-business groups where peer-group choices are hardest, because each business competes in a different market, are described on JOH's group holdings sector page.
JOH Partners is an executive search and senior executive recruitment firm that has advised boards on more than 1,000 senior mandates since 2014, covering the Middle East and Africa from Dubai and Riyadh, the United Kingdom from London and Singapore from Singapore. The reward structures this piece draws on are set out in full in the Gulf Executive Reward Report 2026, which committees can download before their next pay review. To test whether your peer group reflects the market you really hire in, engage a partner for a confidential conversation. Chairs who want to see retention risk across the executive layer as it develops can request a Board Pulse demo.
Questions about this topic.
What is executive pay benchmarking?
Executive pay benchmarking is the comparison of what a company pays its senior executives with what a chosen set of comparable companies pays for roles of similar size. It gives a remuneration committee a range, usually shown as the lower quartile, median and upper quartile, and the committee then decides where in that range to set pay. The result depends on three choices: which companies are in the peer group, how old and complete the data is, and which point in the range the board targets.
How should a Gulf board choose a peer group for executive pay?
By starting from the companies it actually hires from and loses executives to, and then matching ownership type, listing status, sector and size. JOH Partners' Gulf Executive Reward Report 2026 states that there is no single Gulf benchmark: a board must know which comparator set is relevant to its ownership, sector and listing status before it can judge whether a package is competitive.
Why does targeting the upper quartile push executive pay up?
If most companies in a peer group set pay above the middle of the group, the middle moves up at the next survey and each company finds itself back at the median. Pay rises across the group without any change in performance. Saudi Arabia's Capital Market Authority asks listed companies to avoid the disadvantages of such comparisons in leading to unjustifiable increases in pay.
What should a remuneration committee ask its reward adviser about a benchmark?
Who chose each company in the peer group and why; whether the group matches the company's ownership, size and market; when the data was collected and which parts of the package it covers; and where the board is aiming in the range, and why. JOH Partners' research on remuneration committees found that a functioning committee holds benchmarking it has commissioned or reviewed independently of management.
Is the pay peer group the same as the peer group for total shareholder return?
No. A comparator set used to decide the level of pay answers a different question from one used to measure relative returns in a long-term incentive plan. The first should reflect the companies a business competes with for executives. The second should reflect companies whose share price is a fair comparison for the business. A committee should build and review each on its own terms.
Oliver Helvin
Founder and Managing Director
Oliver Helvin is the Founder and Managing Director of JOH Partners. He writes on the GCC executive market, leadership transitions in family-controlled businesses, and the discipline of senior search.
LinkedIn ↗