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JOH Partners
Total Shareholder Return in Gulf Executive Pay: When It Belongs

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Total shareholder return is the change in a share price over a period plus the dividends paid, and it has become the default measure in UK long-term pay plans. in JOH Partners' observation Gulf remuneration committees are now borrowing it for listed companies on Tadawul, the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange and the Dubai Financial Market, because it looks fair and is easy to explain to a board. This piece argues that total shareholder return belongs in a Gulf plan only under conditions that many Gulf companies do not meet, and that where it does belong it should sit beside operating measures and not replace them. It draws on the UK Corporate Governance Code 2024, the UK rule that requires a total shareholder return graph in the remuneration report, and the Saudi Capital Market Authority's Corporate Governance Regulations. It adds no new pay figures, and where it refers to plan practice it points to JOH Partners' published reward research.

What total shareholder return measures

The idea is simple. An investor who bought one share at the start of the period, held it to the end and received every dividend along the way has earned a return. Total shareholder return is that return, usually over three years, and usually compared with what the same investor would have earned in a group of peer companies. If the company ranks in the top quarter of the group, more of the executive's award vests. If it ranks in the bottom half, none does.

Committees like the measure for good reasons. It is outside the control of the executive's own accounting. It speaks directly to what the owners care about. And it is easy to explain, which matters when a plan has to be approved by shareholders. A measure that a board can describe in one sentence is worth something.

The question is what it is measuring in a particular company. The answer in the UK, where the practice grew up, is a share price that moves with the market's view of how the business is run. The answer in some Gulf companies is less clear.

Where the practice comes from

Two UK documents sit behind most of what Gulf committees borrow. The UK Corporate Governance Code 2024 asks that remuneration schemes promote long-term shareholdings by executive directors, with share awards released in stages over a total vesting and holding period of five years or more. It also asks that schemes allow the committee to override formulaic outcomes and that contracts carry malus and clawback terms. Separately, the UK regulations on directors' remuneration reports, in Schedule 8 of SI 2008/410, require a quoted company to publish a graph of its total shareholder return against a broad equity market index.

Read together, the two documents say less about total shareholder return than the practice suggests. The graph is a disclosure, so that shareholders can set pay against performance. The Code sets the holding period, discretion and recovery. As far as JOH Partners' reading of these two documents goes, neither requires total shareholder return to be the measure in a long-term plan. It became the measure because investors and advisers found it useful, in a market with a deep pool of comparable listed companies and a share price that responds to the quality of management.

The Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations, in the English translation reviewed, ask for a remuneration policy that links the variable part of pay to long-term performance, and they warn against peer comparisons that produce unjustifiable increases. They do not name total shareholder return. A Gulf committee that uses it is making its own choice, and should do so knowing which of the UK conditions it can reproduce.

Why the share price may not be management's

The first problem is the price itself. A share price moves when the company's results change, and it also moves when the number of shares available to trade is small and a large holder decides to buy or sell. On the Saudi Main Market, the Capital Market Authority's listing requirements, as summarised in a Baker McKenzie cross-border listings guide, call for at least 30 per cent of shares to be offered to the public at listing, and the authority may allow a lower figure. That leaves up to 70 per cent with founders, the state, families and strategic holders who are not trading in the ordinary way.

In JOH Partners' observation, a stock like that can move for reasons that have nothing to do with the chief executive: a change in index weighting, a fund's decision to rebalance, a large holder's disposal, a rumour. A plan that pays out on such a price is paying for luck, in both directions. The chief executive who is rewarded for a rise she did not cause will not be grateful for long. The one who is penalised for a fall that came from an index change will not stay.

The second problem is the peer group. Relative total shareholder return needs a set of comparable companies, and in most single Gulf markets there are only a handful in any one sector. With fewer than about ten peers, one outlier, such as a company in the middle of a takeover, moves the rank for everyone else. Committees respond by widening the group to the region or to emerging markets, which solves the count and creates new differences: currencies, regulation, state ownership, dividend habits. The more the group is widened, the less it is a comparison of like with like.

The third problem is the dividend. Because dividends are included, the measure in some sectors is largely a measure of payout. In JOH Partners' observation this includes a number of the region's listed banks and similar businesses in financial services, where the dividend is a large part of what a shareholder receives and is set by the board and the main owner. An executive paid on total shareholder return in such a company is partly paid on a decision they do not make.

Total shareholder return tells a committee how the share price did. It does not tell the committee whether the chief executive caused it, and in a thinly traded stock the answer is often no.
— Oliver Helvin, Founder and Managing Director

When the measure earns a place

None of this means total shareholder return has no place in Gulf pay. It means the committee should test the conditions before using it. JOH Partners would put them as follows.

The shares need to trade freely enough that the price reflects the market's view of the business. A real free float, an active market and no single holder who regularly moves the price are the basics. The peer group needs enough comparable companies that one outlier does not set the result. The measurement period should be three years or more, long enough to smooth a bad quarter, and the award should then be held in the way the UK Code suggests, because a measure that ends on the day the shares vest invites a short-term view.

Weight matters as much as design. In JOH Partners' view total shareholder return works best as one measure among several, with a smaller weight than the operating measures that the executive can actually influence, such as profit, cash conversion and return on capital. It is a useful check on those measures. It should not be the whole plan.

Finally, the committee should keep discretion. The Code's language on overriding formulaic outcomes is a good model. If the share price has moved because of an event the executive did not control, such as a state disposal or an index change, the committee should be able to say so and adjust, and to explain the adjustment to shareholders. Recovery terms belong in the same conversation, and JOH Partners' perspective on malus and clawback in Gulf executive pay deals with them separately.

A long-term plan should pay for what the executive did. Where the share price mostly reflects what the owner did, the plan should measure something else.
— Oliver Helvin, Founder and Managing Director

How to set the peer group and the weighting

Where the conditions are met, two design choices carry most of the risk.

The peer group should be chosen by business model, size and market, not by the list of companies the adviser happens to have data for. A committee should be able to say in a sentence why each peer is on the list, and what would cause it to leave. The group should be fixed at the start of the plan, with a rule for what happens when a peer is acquired or delisted. Changing the group in the middle of a plan, to improve the outcome, is the quickest way to lose the trust of shareholders.

The weighting should reflect how much of the share price the executive can actually move. For the chief executive of a company with a free float and a competitive market, a meaningful weight can make sense. For a divisional head, or the finance director, a smaller weight is fairer, because their effect on the group's share price is diluted by everything else the group does. JOH Partners' remuneration committee research and its Gulf executive reward report set out how committees in the region currently work, and are the better place to see what plans look like in practice.

How the executive reads the award

The committee sees a measure. The executive sees a payment, and works out what it is worth. An award of shares that vests only if the group ranks in the top quarter of its peers, three years from now, in a thinly traded market, is worth less to the person holding it than its face value suggests, and an executive who has been offered one will discount it accordingly. A plain explanation of how options, restricted share units and performance share units are valued is useful reading for a committee, because it shows how the same grant looks from the other side of the table.

That discount matters. A committee that believes it is offering a large long-term incentive, and a chief executive who believes she is being offered a small chance of a modest payment, are not looking at the same thing. The gap shows up later as retention risk. It is also why JOH Partners' conversation with Sandrine Bardot on redesigning pay for the Middle East workforce is worth hearing: the argument that fairness in pay is not the same as equality, and that data has to be set against context, applies to long-term plans at the top as much as to the wider workforce.

Committees that want to see how awards are landing, who is holding unvested shares, how close they are to leaving and whether the plan still motivates, can follow those questions with tools such as Board Pulse alongside the pay committee's own review.

When a committee should leave it out

There are four situations where total shareholder return should not be in the plan.

The first is an unlisted company, where there is no share price. Here the long-term incentive plan has to rest on something else, a subject JOH Partners treats in its perspective on the long-term incentive plan without an exit. This piece is about the listed case and leaves unlisted family assets to that one.

The second is a listed company whose shares barely trade, or whose price is largely determined by the decisions of the main owner on dividends and disposals. The measure then reports on the owner.

The third is a company that has just listed. For the first period after a listing the price is still finding its level, and the executive who led the offering is being measured on the market's early mood.

The fourth is a company with too few comparable peers to make a ranking meaningful. A single comparator is not a peer group.

A listed holding is a particular case

A listed holding company brings its own difficulty. One share price sits above several businesses, and each executive runs only one of them. JOH Partners' engagement building group functional leadership at a Tadawul-listed Saudi industrial holding company with an eight-company portfolio is an example of the structure. In a group like that, a measure that moves with the group's share price tells the head of one operating company very little about how well that company is run. Pay for the executives of the individual businesses should lean on the results of their own business, with total shareholder return reserved for the executives who run the whole.

A default a committee can start from

For a committee that wants a place to begin, the default is straightforward. Start with the operating measures that the executive controls. Add total shareholder return only if the shares trade freely, the peer group is large enough and the period is at least three years, and give it the smaller weight. Keep discretion, write down how it will be used and explain every adjustment to shareholders. Leave the measure out where the conditions are not met, and say why. A plan built that way is easier to defend, and it is more likely to be believed by the people who hold it.


Key takeaways


JOH Partners is an executive search and senior executive recruitment firm advising chairs, remuneration committees and family groups on executive appointments and pay across the GCC, the UK and Singapore. A committee reviewing its long-term plan can start with the full Gulf executive reward report, which is available to download, and then engage a partner for a confidential conversation about how its plan compares with what executives are being offered elsewhere. Boards that want continuing visibility of the executive layer can also request a Board Pulse demo.

Frequently asked questions

Questions about this topic.

What is total shareholder return in executive pay?

Total shareholder return is the change in a company's share price over a period plus the dividends paid, usually shown as a percentage and often ranked against a group of peer companies. In executive pay it is used as a measure in long-term plans: the larger the return, or the higher the rank against peers, the more of an award vests.

Do Gulf rules require total shareholder return in long-term incentive plans?

In the Saudi Corporate Governance Regulations, in the English translation reviewed, the remuneration policy is asked to link the variable part of pay to long-term performance, and does not name total shareholder return. UK-quoted companies must publish a total shareholder return graph in the directors' remuneration report, but the UK Corporate Governance Code does not set the measures in a plan. A committee chooses its own measures.

Why can total shareholder return mislead in the Gulf?

Three reasons recur. Thin free float and concentrated state or family holdings can move a share price for reasons management does not control. Peer groups in a single market are small, so one outlier can change the rank. And because dividends count, in sectors where dividends are most of what shareholders receive the measure largely reflects the payout policy that the board and the main owner set.

When should a remuneration committee use total shareholder return?

When the shares trade freely, there is a peer group of enough comparable companies, the measure runs over at least three years, and it sits beside operating measures with a smaller weight. In JOH Partners' view it works best as one measure among several, with the committee holding discretion to adjust for events the executive did not control.

When should a committee leave total shareholder return out?

When the company is unlisted or thinly traded, when the main owner controls the share price through its decisions on dividends and disposals, when the company has just listed and the price is still being discovered, or when there are too few comparable peers. Operating measures such as profit, cash conversion and return on capital then say more about what the executive actually did.

Author

Oliver Helvin

Founder and Managing Director

Oliver Helvin is the Founder and Managing Director of JOH Partners. He writes on the GCC executive market, leadership transitions in family-controlled businesses, and the discipline of senior search.

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