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JOH Partners
Executive Director vs Non-Executive Director on Gulf Boards

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The difference between an executive director and a non-executive director is simple on paper. An executive director works in the company and sits on the board. A non-executive director sits on the board and does not work in the company. Both owe the company the same duties. The trouble on Gulf family and state-linked boards starts in the middle, where owners, family members and senior managers all sit on the board and nobody separates what each of them is there to do. The UAE's Securities and Commodities Authority now asks listed companies for a majority of non-executive directors and at least one-third independents, and Saudi Arabia asks for the greater of two or one-third. Meeting the count is the easy part. This piece sets out what each kind of director is for, what a board gains and loses from having executives in the room, how many is too many, and what a chair can do so that the people who run the company do not talk over the people who are meant to question it.

Executive director vs non-executive director: two jobs, one duty

Start with what they share. In law a director is a director. An executive director who votes for a bad decision is as responsible for it as a non-executive who votes the same way. Nobody on the board can say they were only there to run the finance function.

What differs is the position each person is in. An executive director reports to the chief executive in the working week and sits beside the chief executive at the board table. They are paid by the company, they depend on the chief executive for their career, and the plan they are asked to approve in the boardroom is usually one they helped to write. A non-executive director has none of those ties. They come to the board with an outside view, they are paid a board fee and not a management salary, their career does not depend on the chief executive, and they can say a plan is too aggressive without worrying what it does to their next review.

That is the whole point of having both. The executive directors know where the company is and what is possible. The non-executives are there to ask whether the board is being told the whole story. A board needs the first group to be informed and the second group to be free. When the two are mixed up, the board loses one or the other. JOH's perspective on what the non-executive director role demands covers the second group in detail; this piece is about the line between the two.

Why Gulf boards put management in the room

There are good reasons for it. In a family-controlled group, a son or daughter may run a division and also hold the family's place on the board, and nobody sees a conflict because the family has always worked this way. In a state-linked group, the shareholder may nominate senior officials who are also directors of several companies in the portfolio. In a holding company with many operating businesses, the chief executive of the largest subsidiary may be asked onto the group board because the group cannot be understood without them.

Each of these choices makes sense on its own. The difficulty is that they add up. JOH's research on independent directors on Gulf boards restates the Gulf rules: at least one-third of a UAE listed board must be independent, with a majority non-executive, and the greater of two or one-third in Saudi Arabia as reported by issuers. Those are floors. A board that has met the floor with the minimum number of independents, and filled the rest with family and management, has the structure the codes ask for and not the challenge the codes were written to produce.

Our reading is that this is rarely a deliberate choice. It is habit, trust and convenience. JOH's research on the chairs of Gulf-listed family businesses describes how informal the chair's authority is in many of these groups, and an informal chair is the least able to say that there are already too many executives at the table.

What an executive director gives the board, and what it costs

The case for executive directors is real, and a board that dismisses it will make worse decisions. An executive director brings facts. They know how long a project will take, which customer is about to leave and whether the budget has any slack in it. A board that never hears from the people running the business will hear about problems late.

They also bring commitment. A chief executive who sits on the board owns the board's decisions in a way that an invited guest does not. And they bring continuity: the board can ask them about what was said last time and expect an answer.

The cost is harder to see. Executives find it hard to criticise each other's papers, because they will be working together the next morning. They find it harder still to criticise the chief executive, who decides their pay and their future. They may also hold back from saying what they really think about a plan the family has already blessed. In JOH's observation, the mildest form of the problem is silence. The worse form is a board where the executives speak first, at length, and the independents feel that by the time they are asked, the matter is settled.

Peppy Dosanjh, in his conversation on transformation, trust and psychological safety, argues that without psychological safety the information a leader receives is already wrong. A boardroom is a particular case of the same thing. If the people closest to the facts cannot say what they see without a cost, the board is working from a cleaned-up version of the facts.

If most of the people at the table work for the chief executive, the board cannot tell the chief executive anything the chief executive does not already know.
— Oliver Helvin, Founder and Managing Director

A composite: the board that heard from itself

This is a composite of situations JOH has seen, with the details changed. It is not a client case.

A diversified family group has nine directors. The chair is the founder's eldest son. Two of his siblings sit on the board, one of whom runs the real estate division. The chief executive and the chief financial officer are directors. The head of the largest operating company has been on the board for years, and two independents, a former banker and a former regulator, were added after the group registered for a bond issue.

On paper the board meets the rules: five of nine are non-executive and two are independent. In practice, when the real estate division brings a large land purchase to the board, the chief executive supports it, the chief financial officer says the numbers work, the head of the operating company has no view, and the sibling who runs the division has prepared the paper. The two independents ask good questions and are answered politely. By the time they speak, four of the seven who have spoken have said yes. The purchase is approved.

Nothing improper has happened. The independents had a chance to speak. But the board has heard the same view from six angles, all of which sit inside the management line, and the one view that sits outside it has arrived last and alone. This is what marking its own homework looks like in practice. The group's governance report would show a board with independents. It would not show that the decision had already been made before they spoke.

How many executive directors are too many

There is no number in any Gulf code for executive directors as such. The codes set a floor for independents and a majority for non-executives, and the executive count is whatever is left. That is a poor guide, because a board can meet both tests and still be dominated by management.

JOH's observation, from its board and chief executive mandates, is that boards settle well at one or two executive directors: the chief executive, and sometimes the chief financial officer. Beyond two, a new problem starts. Management has a bloc. Each executive director added to the board is a person who reports to the chief executive and is judged by the chief executive, and the board's outside voices have to be heard against a larger and larger group of people who share a view of how the business runs.

A better question than "how many?" is "who is missing from the table?" A board that has the chief executive but no independent with finance experience, no one who has run a business of similar size, and no one who is not connected to the controlling shareholder, has a problem that adding or removing an executive director will not solve. JOH's perspective on board refreshment and the five-year mix looks at how to build the independent group deliberately. The executive count follows from that, not the other way round.

How a chair keeps management's voice from crowding the room

A chair does not have to reduce the number of executives on the board to get a better debate. Three changes to how meetings run will do more than a change to the list of directors.

The first is the order of speaking. On any significant decision, the chair asks the independent directors for their view before management gives theirs. This feels odd the first time. After two or three meetings it becomes normal, and the board begins to hear what the independents think before management has framed the discussion.

The second is a short session of non-executive directors alone at each meeting, with no executives and no minute-taker unless the group wants one. Ten minutes is enough. It is where a director can say that a plan looks thin and hear whether anyone else thinks so. The senior independent director is often the right person to lead it where the chair is also a shareholder representative.

The third is the paper. A paper that reports a decision already taken is of little use to the board. A paper that sets out the choice, the options and the recommendation gives the independents something to work with. A chair can ask for the second kind and decline to table the first.

The same principle applies to committees. The audit, remuneration and nomination committees exist to review management's work, pay and succession. An executive director on any of them is reviewing their own. They can attend to answer questions. They should not be members.

A chair does not need fewer executives on the board. A chair needs the independent directors to speak first.
— Oliver Helvin, Founder and Managing Director

Where this sits next to the roles around it

Two neighbouring questions are covered elsewhere. The first is the split between the chair and the chief executive, and what happens when one person holds both, which JOH's perspective on the executive chairman and the chief executive takes in turn. The second is the independent role itself, including what the nominating committee should look for, which the perspective on the non-executive director role addresses. This piece stays on the boundary between the executive and non-executive halves of a single board.

For readers weighing an offer to join a board as an executive director, the candidate view is in the interview guide on executive director interview questions, which sets out what a chair and a nomination committee will test in someone wearing two hats.

The practical test for a chair is a simple one. Count the people at the next board meeting who report to the chief executive. Then count the independents. Then ask how many of the independents had the chance to speak before the decision was made. A chair who finds the answers uncomfortable has found the work to do.

A board that wants a continuing read on who in the executive layer is ready to carry a board role, and which of its directors are carrying more than one, can use platforms such as Board Pulse to keep that picture current between meetings. JOH's group holdings sector page sets out where the firm sees these structures most often. JOH's engagement building group functional leadership at a Saudi industrial holding of eight operating companies is a reminder of how many senior people a group of that kind has competing for a place at the board table, and why the board needs a clear rule for who gets one.


Key takeaways


JOH Partners is an executive search and senior executive recruitment firm advising chairs, nomination committees and family groups on board, chair and chief executive appointments across the GCC, the UK and Singapore. To see how your board divides the work between management and independent directors, request a Board Pulse demo for a continuing view of your executive layer, or engage a partner for a confidential conversation about your board's mix.

Frequently asked questions

Questions about this topic.

What is the difference between an executive director and a non-executive director?

An executive director holds a management job in the company as well as a place on the board, for example the chief executive or the chief financial officer. A non-executive director sits on the board only and has no management role. In law both owe the company the same duties, and both are responsible for the board's decisions. The practical difference is independence from management: a non-executive director can question a paper without having helped to write it.

How many executive directors should a Gulf board have?

There is no single number. Gulf codes ask for a majority of non-executive directors and a minimum share of independents, so the count of executives is capped by what is left. JOH Partners' observation is that one or two executive directors, usually the chief executive and sometimes the chief financial officer, is where most well-run boards settle. The more management on the board, the harder it is for the board to question management.

Can an executive director sit on the audit or remuneration committee?

In practice they should not. The audit, remuneration and nomination committees exist to review management's work, pay and succession, and an executive director would be reviewing their own. Most Gulf codes ask for non-executive or independent members on these committees. An executive director can attend by invitation to answer questions and should leave when the committee discusses their own role or pay.

Why do family-controlled Gulf boards have so many executive directors?

Family members often work in the business and also represent the family's shareholding on the board, so the same person holds two roles. Senior managers are then added because the owner trusts them. In JOH Partners' observation this is a matter of habit and trust, not of design, and it can be changed without reducing the family's control by giving independent directors a defined part of the work.

What should a chair do if executive directors dominate board discussion?

Change the order of speaking and the order of papers. Ask the independent directors for their view before management gives theirs, hold a short session of non-executives alone at each meeting, and ask for papers that propose a decision, not papers that report one. A chair who does these three things will quickly see how much of the debate was management speaking to itself.

Author

Oliver Helvin

Founder and Managing Director

Oliver Helvin is the Founder and Managing Director of JOH Partners. He writes on the GCC executive market, leadership transitions in family-controlled businesses, and the discipline of senior search.

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