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CEO Performance Evaluation on Gulf Boards 2026

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Executive summary
  • Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar all make the board responsible for the performance of executive management. Qatar's 2025 code is the most explicit, with a yearly evaluation of senior executive management and specific criteria set by a committee.
  • None of the rules reviewed says who writes the chief executive's objectives or when, what evidence the appraisal should rest on, or that it should be discussed alongside the succession plan.
  • JOH Partners' reading of its own mandates is that most Gulf boards judge the chief executive once a year, on the financial result and the chair's impression, and keep the appraisal apart from succession.
  • The report closes with what a chair can put in place before the next cycle, and the PDF edition adds a worked example, a comparison with Singapore's code and a ten-question self-test.

CEO performance evaluation is the board's formal judgement of how well the chief executive has done the job against objectives agreed in advance, and it is the decision that most directly ties a board to the company's results. This report, the twenty-fifth in JOH Partners' Gulf leadership series, reviews what the governance rules of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar ask a board to do when it appraises its chief executive, with the UK Corporate Governance Code 2024 as comparator. It then sets out JOH's reading, drawn from its own board and chief executive mandates, of how Gulf boards do it in practice. The pattern is consistent. Most boards judge the chief executive once a year, on the financial result and on the chair's impression. Few agree objectives before the year starts, gather evidence beyond the chief executive's own report, or connect the appraisal to the succession plan. The report closes with what a chair can put in place before the next cycle.

Four rulebooks. Governance texts reviewed for this report: Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, with the UK Corporate Governance Code 2024 as comparator

JOH Partners review of public rules, November 2026.

Once a year. The minimum frequency at which Qatar's 2025 code asks a listed company's board to evaluate itself and its senior executive management

QFMA Board Decision No. 5 of 2025, Governance Code for Listed Companies, Article 3.

Fourteen of sixty. GCC family-controlled listed companies in JOH's succession study with a documented internal successor the board could name

JOH Partners, The succession gap, edition 2 of this series.

What is a CEO performance evaluation for?

A board has few decisions that matter more than who runs the company, and it makes that decision more often than it thinks. Every year it keeps a chief executive in post, it has decided again. The appraisal is where that decision should be made on evidence.

A sound CEO performance evaluation does four things. It measures the chief executive against objectives the board agreed at the start of the year, not against a list put together at the end. It draws on more than the chief executive's own account of the year. It is run by directors who are independent of the chief executive. And it feeds two other decisions: what the chief executive is paid, and who would take over if the board needed a change.

The UK Corporate Governance Code 2024 is the text most Gulf codes borrow from, and it states the idea briefly. Provision 13 says non-executive directors have a prime role in appointing and removing executive directors, and that they should scrutinise and hold management and individual executive directors to account "against agreed performance objectives". Provision 21 asks for a formal and rigorous annual review of the board, its committees, the chair and individual directors. Principle P asks that pay be designed to support strategy and long-term success. The Code is published by the Financial Reporting Council and applies to accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2025.

What the Code does not do is describe a method. The FRC's Corporate Governance Code Guidance covers the board performance review at length, including peer review and feedback to each director, but says little about how the chief executive's own appraisal should be run. That is left to the board, and the same is true, to a greater degree, in the Gulf.

This report deals with one question: how a board appraises its chief executive. JOH's perspective on the board effectiveness review, and what it misses covers the board's review of itself, and JOH's research on who sets executive pay in the Gulf covers how the remuneration committee works.

What the Gulf codes ask of the board

The three Gulf rulebooks reviewed all make the board responsible for the performance of executive management. They differ in how specific they are about the chief executive, about objectives and about the link to succession.

Figure 01FIG-01

What the rules reviewed ask of a board appraising its chief executive

MarketText reviewedWho evaluates executive managementObjectives or criteriaLink to payLink to successionWhat is disclosed
Saudi ArabiaCMA Corporate Governance Regulations, amended January 2023The board reviews and evaluates the performance of executive management (Article 24)Yearly assessment against indicators linked to strategic objectives, on the nomination committee's proposal (Article 39, a guiding article)Remuneration policy linked to performance (Articles 58 and 59)The board develops succession plans for management (Article 24)How the board assessed itself, its committees and members (Article 87); pay of the five highest-paid senior executives including the chief executive and chief financial officer (Article 90)
UAESCA governance guide, Decision 3/Chairman of 2020, as hosted by the European Corporate Governance InstituteThe board sets performance objectives and monitors the company's overall performance (Article 14); yearly evaluation covers the board, members and committees (Article 12)Company objectives; no separate appraisal of the chief executive foundSenior executive rewards commensurate with company performance, linked over the medium and long term (Article 59)Committee identifies the competencies needed at senior executive level (Article 59); no express succession duty foundSalaries and bonuses of each senior executive (Article 77)
QatarQFMA Governance Code for Listed Companies, Board Decision No. 5 of 2025The board evaluates senior executive management at least once a year, through the nomination, remuneration and incentives committee (Article 3)Committee establishes specific criteria for evaluating the board and senior executive management (Article 4)Pay based on performance evaluation measured against long-term performance (Article 8)Chief executive appointed under a board-approved succession plan; committee ensures a plan for senior executive managementEvaluation of the performance of senior executive management in the governance report (Article 11)
UK comparatorCorporate Governance Code 2024, Provisions 13, 17 and 21 and Principle PNon-executive directors hold executive directors to account (Provision 13)Agreed performance objectives (Provision 13)Pay designed to support strategy and long-term success (Principle P)Nomination committee ensures succession plans for the board and senior management (Provision 17)Board performance review described, with any external reviewer named (Provision 21)
Figure 01. The table reports the rule as found in the texts named. The UAE guide was read in a third-party copy of the 2020 text, which has been amended since. A board should read the current primary text for its own market and listing venue.Source · JOH Partners review of public rules, November 2026

Saudi Arabia's Corporate Governance Regulations give the plainest statement of the duty. Article 24 asks the board to select and appoint the chief executive and oversee the work, to "review and evaluate the performance of the Executive Management", and to develop succession plans for the management of the company. Article 39 goes further. It asks the board to set up, on the nomination committee's proposal, mechanisms to assess the board, its members and committees and the executive management each year, using key performance indicators linked to how far the company's strategic objectives have been achieved. Article 39 is marked as a guiding article, so a company may depart from it.

The UAE's governance guide of 2020 is more general. Article 14 asks the board to set performance objectives and monitor implementation and the overall performance of the company, and Article 12 asks for an annual evaluation of the board, its members and its committees. Article 59 asks the nomination and remuneration committee to keep senior executive rewards in line with the company's performance and to link bonuses to performance over the medium and long term. The 2020 text, as reviewed, names no separate appraisal of the chief executive, and the 2024 amendments, as KPMG summarises them, do not appear to add one.

Qatar's 2025 code is the most explicit of the three. Article 3 asks the board to evaluate, at least once a year, its own performance, that of its committees and members, and that of senior executive management, with the work done by the nomination, remuneration and incentives committee. Article 4 asks that committee to establish specific criteria for evaluating the board and senior executive management and to make sure a succession plan for senior executive management exists. Article 8 asks that pay rest on performance evaluation measured against the company's long-term performance, and Article 11 asks the governance report to include an evaluation of the performance of senior executive management. The code was published in the Official Gazette in August 2025 and gave companies a year to comply, which the regulator may extend.

Where the rules go quiet

Read together, the rules say the board must evaluate executive management, that pay should follow performance and, in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, that a succession plan should exist. They leave three things open.

The first is the objectives. The UK Code speaks of objectives agreed in advance, Saudi Arabia's guiding article speaks of indicators linked to strategy, and Qatar's code asks a committee to set criteria. None of the texts says who writes the chief executive's objectives, when, or how many there should be. A board can comply with every rule reviewed and still settle the targets in the last quarter of the year it is measuring.

The second is the evidence. The rules ask for an evaluation. They do not say what it should rest on. Nothing in the texts reviewed asks the board to hear from anyone other than the chief executive and the people who report to the board already, and nothing stops an appraisal from consisting of a results pack and a private conversation with the chair.

The third is disclosure. Saudi Arabia's Article 87 asks the board report to state how the board assessed itself, its committees and its members, and Article 90 asks for the pay of the five highest-paid senior executives, including the chief executive and the chief financial officer, which the regulations allow to be shown as a total. The UAE guide asks for the salaries and bonuses of each senior executive. Only Qatar asks for an evaluation of senior executive management in the governance report. Outside Qatar, a shareholder can usually see what the chief executive was paid without seeing how the board judged the year.

None of this is a fault in the drafting. A regulator can require an evaluation to take place. It cannot make a board take it seriously.

How Gulf boards judge the chief executive today

What follows is JOH Partners' observation from its own board and chief executive mandates, set out as a reading and not as a measurement.

In most Gulf groups JOH works with, the chief executive is judged once a year, close to the results and the bonus decision. The board looks at the financial outcome against budget, and the chair forms a view of the person. The two together settle the bonus and, usually without anyone saying so, whether the chief executive stays.

Three features recur. The objectives are mostly financial and mostly the budget, so the appraisal asks whether the company hit its numbers rather than whether the chief executive did the things only a chief executive can do: build the team beneath, move the strategy on, keep the board properly informed. The evidence is mostly the chief executive's own: the management report, the results presentation, and the chief executive's account of what went well. And the conversation is mostly between two people. The chair and the chief executive meet, the chair reports a view to the committee or to the principal, and the minutes record a decision.

This works while results are good and the relationship holds. It fails in two predictable ways. A chief executive who is delivering the numbers while losing the senior team is not caught until the departures begin, which is the pattern the ninety-day signal: spotting executive derailment describes early in an appointment and which can recur at any point in a tenure. And a chief executive who misses the numbers for reasons no one could control can lose the job on a single year, because the board has no other evidence to weigh.

Family-controlled groups add a further layer. Where the principal or the family council holds the real authority over the chief executive, the formal appraisal is often the record of a judgement reached elsewhere. In state-linked groups, the shareholder entity often runs its own review of the chief executives in its portfolio, and the company's board may not see what it says.

Most Gulf chief executives are judged on one year's numbers and one conversation with the chair. That is not enough evidence to keep someone in the job, or to replace them.
— Oliver Helvin, Founder and Managing Director

Objectives the board agrees before the year starts

The change that improves an appraisal most is to write the objectives down before the year begins and to agree them at the board, not between the chair and the chief executive alone.

A workable set is short. Four to six objectives is enough; more than that and the appraisal turns into a checklist. JOH suggests three kinds. The first is the financial plan, which the board has already approved as the budget and which should carry real weight but not all of it. The second is two or three strategic objectives for the year, each one something that will not happen unless the chief executive makes it happen: an acquisition integrated, a new market opened, a cost base reset. The third is leadership: the strength of the team beneath the chief executive, the readiness of at least one internal successor, and the quality of the chief executive's working relationship with the board.

Each objective needs a line on what good looks like, written so that a director who was not in the room could judge it a year later. Where an objective changes during the year because the business changes, the board should record the change when it happens, not at the year end.

The objectives should also connect to the brief the chief executive was hired against. In JOH's engagement finding a Saudi industrial group's first non-family CEO, the family signed a one-page mandate brief before any candidate was approached, setting out success criteria, decision rights and the compensation envelope. A brief of that kind is the natural basis for the first year's objectives, and a board that has one should not start again from a blank page.

Agree the chief executive's objectives before the year starts and write them down. Every other part of the appraisal depends on that one step.
— Oliver Helvin, Founder and Managing Director

What evidence should the board gather?

An appraisal is only as good as what the board knows. The chief executive's own report should be one input among several.

The others are not hard to collect. The financial outcome against budget and against the prior year comes from the finance function. Progress on each strategic objective can be reported by the executive responsible and tested by a director who knows the area. The view of the senior team beneath the chief executive can be gathered in confidence, by the chair, the company secretary or an adviser, with a short set of questions asked the same way each year. The view of each director should be sought individually and not only in the meeting, because a board discussion tends to settle on the view of whoever speaks first.

Two sources are often missed. The first is the chief executive's self-assessment against the agreed objectives, written before the board meets. It shows whether the chief executive sees the year the way the board does, and the gap between the two views is often the most useful finding. The second is the chief executive's record on people: who has left the senior team and why, who has been promoted, and whether the internal successors named a year ago are closer to ready. Santi Rasanayagam, in his conversation on moving from CFO to CEO, describes the parts of the job that sit close to customers, operations and people, which rarely show up in a results pack and which a board will only see if it asks.

The FRC's guidance on board reviews, written for directors generally, makes a related point: a review is more valuable when each individual receives feedback. The same holds for the chief executive. An appraisal that ends with a bonus figure and no conversation has done half its work.

For boards that want a continuing read on the executive layer, and not only a yearly snapshot, Board Pulse keeps that evidence current between appraisals.

Who should run the appraisal?

The rules point in different directions. The UK Code gives the task to the non-executive directors as a group and does not say who leads. In Saudi Arabia the board evaluates executive management on mechanisms the nomination committee proposes. In Qatar the nomination, remuneration and incentives committee carries out the evaluation. In the UAE the guide leaves it to the board.

JOH's view is that the chair should lead it and should not run it alone. The chair has the closest working relationship with the chief executive and the best sense of the year, which is exactly why a second view is needed. A workable arrangement has the chair lead, the nomination or remuneration committee own the process and the record, and one independent director, the senior independent director where there is one, collect the views of the other directors and sit in on the final conversation.

Where the chair is also an executive, or is the principal shareholder, the arrangement matters more. An executive chair whose work overlaps with the chief executive's cannot judge it alone, and a principal who appoints and pays the chief executive personally will find it hard to hear a different view from the board. In both cases an independent director should lead the evidence-gathering and present it to the chair, and the board should record that this was done.

In a state-linked group, the company's board should agree with the shareholder entity which review counts. Two parallel appraisals with different objectives give the chief executive two masters and leave the board without authority.

Linking the appraisal to pay and to succession

The appraisal decides two other things, whether the board says so or not.

The first is pay. Every text reviewed links executive pay to performance in some form, and Qatar's 2025 code links it to performance evaluation measured over the long term. In JOH's observation the link in practice is often only to the annual bonus, and the bonus is often set by formula on the financial result. When the appraisal covers more than the financial result, the remuneration committee needs a way to reflect it: a weighting for strategic and leadership objectives, and room to adjust a formula outcome the appraisal does not support. The FRC's guidance asks UK remuneration policies to provide for discretion to override formulaic outcomes.

The second is succession. Saudi Arabia's Article 24 and Qatar's 2025 code both ask for succession plans, and the UK Code asks the nomination committee to make sure they exist. None asks for the chief executive's appraisal and the succession plan to be discussed together. They should be. The appraisal is the moment the board looks hardest at the chief executive, and it is the natural moment to ask who could do the job if a change were needed, and how ready they are.

JOH's earlier research shows why. The succession gap: readiness across sixty GCC family groups found that forty-seven of sixty GCC family-controlled listed companies expect a succession event at chief executive or chair level within five years, and that only fourteen have a documented internal successor whose name the board could give with the candidate's awareness. The 2026 Gulf operator-CEO index found a median tenure of seven years among sixty-four operating chief executives, with the seven-to-eleven-year middle producing the highest rate of unplanned transitions. A board that appraises its chief executive every year without asking about succession will meet those numbers unprepared.

The appraisal and the succession plan belong on the same agenda. A board that keeps them apart finds out how thin its options are on the day the chief executive resigns.
— Oliver Helvin, Founder and Managing Director

What a chair can put in place before the next cycle

For a company whose financial year ends in December, a chair who starts now can change the next appraisal without amending a charter.

The first step is to write next year's objectives before the year starts: four to six, approved by the board, each with a line on what good looks like. The second is to agree the evidence in advance: the chief executive's self-assessment, a confidential read of the senior team, an individual view from each director and a short report on the people record. The third is to settle who runs it, with the chair leading, a committee owning the record and an independent director gathering views. The fourth is to put the appraisal and the chief executive's succession file on the same agenda once a year, and to minute both. The fifth is to tell the remuneration committee what the appraisal found before it decides the bonus, and to give it room to depart from the formula.

None of these steps needs the chief executive's consent, though a good chief executive will welcome most of them. A chief executive who is confident about the year usually wants a fair hearing on more than the numbers, and a written record protects both sides when the board's view and the chief executive's differ.

The next twelve months

Two developments in the rules are worth watching. The first is Qatar. The one-year compliance period under the 2025 code ran from its publication in August 2025, subject to any extension, so governance reports for the 2026 financial year should be the first to carry an evaluation of senior executive management under it. How much those evaluations say will show whether the requirement changes practice or adds a paragraph. The second is the United Kingdom, where the 2024 Code applies to accounting periods that began on or after 1 January 2025 and the first annual reports under it are now appearing. Gulf boards that benchmark against the UK will see how companies there describe holding executives to account against agreed objectives.

Beyond the rules, the change JOH expects is the one already visible in its mandates: boards asking for evidence on the chief executive beyond the numbers, and nomination committees being asked, at the same meeting, who would follow. Groups that already do both tend to make chief executive changes on their own timetable. JOH's group holdings sector page sets out where the firm sees these structures most often.

Methodology and sources

This report is built from public sources and JOH Partners' qualitative reading of its own board, chair and chief executive mandates since 2014. The public layer is the UK Corporate Governance Code 2024 and the Corporate Governance Code Guidance of January 2024 from the Financial Reporting Council; Saudi Arabia's Capital Market Authority Corporate Governance Regulations, as amended by Resolution 8-5-2023, read in the Authority's own English text; the UAE Securities and Commodities Authority's governance guide of 2020 (Decision 3/Chairman of 2020), read in a copy hosted by the European Corporate Governance Institute, with KPMG's summary of the 2024 amendments; and the Qatar Financial Markets Authority's Governance Code for Listed Companies (Board Decision No. 5 of 2025), read in the Authority's English translation, where the Arabic text prevails. Every provision cited was checked against those texts in November 2026. Figures restated from earlier editions are taken from JOH Partners' published research on succession in GCC family groups and its 2026 operator-CEO index. The JOH layer is directional observation, labelled as such, and carries no new counts or percentages.

The report has not reviewed the appraisal records of any particular company and does not claim to measure how many Gulf boards work in any one way. Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman were not reviewed for this edition. The UAE guide was read in a third-party copy of the 2020 text and has been amended since, so a board should read the current primary text for its own market and take local advice before relying on any detail here. The worked example in the PDF edition is a composite, not an account of a specific engagement. Nothing here is legal advice. JOH Partners does not hold a proprietary dataset on chief executive appraisal, and no dataset block is attached to this report.



JOH Partners is an executive search and senior executive recruitment firm advising chairs, nomination committees and family groups on board, chair and chief executive appointments across the Middle East and Africa, the United Kingdom and Singapore. For the full report, download the PDF above, then request a Board Pulse demo for a continuing read on your executive layer between appraisals, or engage a partner to talk through how your board appraises its chief executive today.

Team behind the report

Oliver Helvin

Founder and Managing Director

Oliver Helvin is the Founder and Managing Director of JOH Partners, based in the Middle East. With over 20 years of experience in multinational corporations across Europe and the Middle East, he has held pivotal roles at Gulftainer, Al Futtaim, BP and AstraZeneca, where he led recruitment functions and built the policies, processes and KPIs that drove change and efficiency in each organisation he served. He founded JOH Partners in 2014 to deliver retained executive search the way it should be done: partner-led, research-rigorous and accountable for retention twenty-four months after the hire.

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Frequently asked questions

Questions about this research.

What is a CEO performance evaluation?

It is the board's formal judgement of how well the chief executive has done the job over a set period, usually a year, measured against objectives the board agreed in advance. A sound evaluation rests on more than the chief executive's own report, is led by directors who are independent of the chief executive, and feeds two further decisions: what the chief executive is paid and who could take over if the board needed a change.

Do Gulf governance codes require boards to evaluate the chief executive?

They require the board to evaluate executive management, which includes the chief executive. Saudi Arabia's Corporate Governance Regulations ask the board to review and evaluate the performance of executive management, with a guiding article on yearly assessment against indicators linked to strategy. Qatar's 2025 code asks for a yearly evaluation of senior executive management against criteria set by the nomination, remuneration and incentives committee. The UAE's 2020 guide asks the board to set performance objectives for the company and links senior executive pay to company performance, but names no separate appraisal of the chief executive.

Who should run the chief executive's appraisal on a Gulf board?

JOH Partners' view is that the chair should lead it but not run it alone. A workable arrangement has the chair lead, the nomination or remuneration committee own the process and the record, and one independent director gather the views of the other directors. Where the chair is an executive or the principal shareholder, an independent director should lead the evidence-gathering.

What objectives should a board set for its chief executive?

Four to six, agreed by the board before the year starts. JOH suggests three kinds: the financial plan the board has already approved as the budget; two or three strategic objectives that will not happen unless the chief executive makes them happen; and leadership objectives covering the team beneath the chief executive, the readiness of an internal successor and the relationship with the board. Each needs a line describing what good looks like.

How should a CEO appraisal connect to pay and succession?

The remuneration committee should see what the appraisal found before it decides the bonus, and should have room to depart from a formula outcome the appraisal does not support. The succession file for the chief executive should be reviewed at the same meeting as the appraisal, so the board asks each year who could do the job and how ready they are.