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JOH Partners
Garden Leave for Gulf Executives: What a Board Should Enforce

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Garden leave is a notice period in which an executive stays on the payroll but does not work, does not contact clients and does not start the next job. Gulf boards use it less than they should, and they lean on a different tool instead: a long non-compete in the contract. The result, in JOH Partners' observation, is a board that pays for protection it may not have. The UAE's Federal Decree-Law No. 33 of 2021 and Saudi Arabia's labour law both let an employer write a non-compete into a contract, and both limit what that clause can do. A two-year ban that looks strong on the page may be narrower in practice than the board thinks, while the notice period that would have bought real time is short. This piece sets out what a board is actually buying with these terms, what the law allows in plain terms, and what a remuneration committee should require instead.

Garden leave and non-competes: what the board is really buying

The two terms do different jobs, and boards often treat them as one.

Garden leave works during the notice period. The executive has resigned or been told to go, but is still employed. For the weeks or months that follow, they are paid and kept away from the work. The board gets time: time to find a successor, to move the client relationships to someone else, and to let the executive's knowledge go out of date before they can use it for a competitor. It costs the company the executive's salary for a period in which they do nothing, which is why it is used for the roles where that is cheaper than the alternative.

A non-compete works after the job has ended. It tries to stop the executive working for a competitor for a defined period. It costs the company nothing on the day it is signed and may cost a great deal on the day someone tries to enforce it.

A third family of terms does quieter work. A non-solicitation clause stops the executive taking named clients, staff or partners. A confidentiality clause covers the information itself. These are narrower than a non-compete, easier to explain to a court and easier to defend. A board that wants real protection usually gets most of it from this group, the notice period and the money it keeps at risk, and relatively little from the long non-compete everyone expects to see.

The Gulf pattern: a long ban and a short notice

JOH's reading of executive contracts across its Gulf mandates, offered as observation and not as measurement, is that a typical senior contract has two features that pull in opposite directions. The non-compete is long, often the two years the law allows, and drafted broadly. The notice period is short, often a month or three, and in practice easy to walk through by agreeing a payment or a quiet release.

The board feels protected because the ban is long. The executive knows the ban is hard to enforce, and that the real cost of leaving is a short conversation about notice. The result is a contract that looks strict and behaves loosely. A board that wants to change the position does not usually need a longer ban. It needs a notice period that matches the job and a clearer view of what it will do when someone resigns.

The structure of pay makes this worse. JOH's Gulf Executive Reward Report 2026 restates Aon's analysis of 100 listed GCC companies over 2016 to 2025, which found that cash accounts for roughly 85 to 95 per cent of executive remuneration. Pay that is mostly cash, paid in the year it is earned, leaves the board with very little to hold when the executive leaves. There is no unvested award to lose.

What the law allows, in plain terms

This is a general summary and not legal advice, and a board should take advice for its own contracts and jurisdiction.

For the UAE onshore and in free zones that follow the federal labour law, Federal Decree-Law No. 33 of 2021 came into effect on 2 February 2022. As K&L Gates summarised it, the law sets prior written notice for termination of not less than 30 days and not more than 90. As Khaleej Times reported it, citing Article 10, a non-compete must be in the employment contract, must be limited by place, time and type of work to what protects a legitimate business interest, and cannot run for more than two years after the contract ends. The same article says the clause is void where the employer ends the contract in breach of the law. The summaries reviewed for this piece do not mention garden leave by name, which suggests it rests on the contract and on the notice the law allows. The practical point for a board is that a notice period of six months in an onshore UAE contract may not do what the board expects, and the committee should ask counsel before it relies on it.

For Saudi Arabia, a board can start from a plain account of how Saudi law treats notice, end-of-service pay and non-competes in senior contracts, which sets out that a non-compete must be in writing, specific about time, place and type of work, and cannot run beyond two years. The same account notes that senior Saudi contracts often set their own, longer notice and may include garden leave.

Employers in the DIFC and ADGM, and in free zones with their own employment laws, work under different rules, and this piece does not review them.

The main thing to take from all this is that the law lets the board write a restriction, and then narrows it. The board should assume that a broad, long clause will be cut down if it is ever tested, and should draft the narrower version it expects to defend.

Three protections that do more than a clause

A remuneration committee that wants real protection has three things to put in place, none of which depends on going to court.

The first is notice and garden leave matched to the job. A group chief financial officer who holds the lender relationships, or a chief executive of a listed subsidiary who holds the regulator's trust, is worth a longer notice period than a head of function whose work can be covered in a month. The committee should decide, role by role, how long it needs to move the relationships and replace the person, and then check with counsel how much of that the law will let it write.

The second is narrow restrictions that can be defended. A non-solicitation clause naming the clients, staff and partners the executive will actually touch is easier to enforce than a ban on working in the sector. A confidentiality clause that identifies the information is easier to defend than one that says everything is confidential. JOH's perspective on malus and clawback in Gulf executive pay explains why a clause that looks sound on paper can still fail against local employment law, and the same caution applies here.

The third is money that stays at risk. A bonus deferred for two or three years, or a long-term award that vests after a set period and lapses on a bad departure, does more to hold an executive than a clause. JOH's perspective on the long-term incentive plan without an exit covers how to build one where there are no listed shares. An executive weighing a move to a competitor is far more likely to stop and think when they would be leaving a year of deferred pay on the table.

A non-compete the board will never enforce is a comfort, not a protection. Pay that is still unpaid on the day someone resigns is a protection.
— Oliver Helvin, Founder and Managing Director

An illustration: the chief financial officer who left in ninety days

What follows is an illustration assembled from several situations. It is not a client case, and the details are changed.

A family group's chief financial officer resigns to join a rival. The contract has a two-year non-compete covering the whole sector in the Gulf and a notice period of three months. The group's counsel advises that the ban is broad and unlikely to hold in full. The family does not want a public fight with an executive who has been in its offices for nine years, and the matter is quietly settled. The executive works out a shortened notice and starts at the rival within the quarter.

What the group had was a ban it did not intend to enforce and a notice period of ninety days. What it lacked was a successor ready, a say over the information he took with him, and any pay still unpaid. A deferred award with a clear leaver clause would have given the committee something to discuss. A longer notice period within what the law permits would have given the group time to prepare the lenders. Neither would have required a lawsuit.

Decide what you will enforce before you need to

The most useful step a board can take is to decide in advance what it will actually do. Enforcement costs money, takes time and damages relationships in a business community where the same few hundred people meet again and again. Many boards will not sue a former executive whatever the clause says, and the executive knows it.

That is not a reason to give up on the clause. It is a reason to decide, before drafting, which parts of the package the board is prepared to defend and which it is only signalling. A committee that has made that choice can put its protection into terms it can apply without a court: notice, garden leave, deferred pay, a narrow non-solicit. It can also write down who decides, in the event of a resignation, whether to enforce, release or negotiate, so that the answer does not depend on who happens to be in the room.

The restrictions that come in with a new hire

A group that hires senior people from other firms has the other half of this problem. Every executive it brings in has terms of their own, and a board that hires without checking them takes on the risk. The simplest step is to ask for the candidate's contract before the offer is made, to see what notice they owe, what restrictions apply and what unpaid awards they would leave behind. JOH's perspective on sign-on bonuses and buy-out awards covers how a board pays for what a new hire gives up. A search such as JOH's placement of a chief technology officer at a tier-one GCC universal bank is a reminder that senior hires of this kind arrive from another employer, with terms already attached.

Santi Rasanayagam, in his conversation on moving from CFO to CEO, describes a rule of hiring slowly and parting quickly. Exits are cheaper when the contract was written for the day someone leaves and not for the day they arrive.

Boards write contracts for the day an executive joins. The terms that matter are the ones that apply on the day the executive leaves.
— Oliver Helvin, Founder and Managing Director

Where this sits next to the pay decisions around it

This piece is about the board's position on restrictive terms, at hire and at exit. Three neighbouring decisions are covered elsewhere. The perspective on executive severance in the Gulf owns the cost of a departure. The perspective on sign-on bonuses and buy-out awards owns the payment that buys a hire out of what they leave. The candidate guide to executive offer negotiation owns the executive's view of these same terms. JOH's perspective on the remuneration committee and who sets executive pay explains why this belongs on the committee's agenda and not only with legal counsel.

Boards that want a continuing view of which executives carry the relationships the group cannot afford to lose, and how engaged they are, can use platforms such as Board Pulse to see it before a resignation arrives. The group holdings where these questions come up most are set out on JOH's group holdings sector page.


Key takeaways


JOH Partners is an executive search and senior executive recruitment firm advising chairs, remuneration committees and family groups on executive appointments and pay across the GCC, the UK and Singapore. For the pay figures behind this piece, download the Gulf Executive Reward Report 2026, then engage a partner for a confidential conversation about how your restrictive terms compare. Boards that want a continuing read on executive retention risk can also request a Board Pulse demo.

Frequently asked questions

Questions about this topic.

What is garden leave for an executive?

Garden leave is a notice period during which the executive stays on the payroll and keeps their pay and benefits, but is told not to work, not to contact clients or colleagues and not to start a new job. It gives the company time to protect relationships and information while a successor is found. It is a term of the contract and the notice the law allows, not a separate legal right.

Are non-compete clauses enforceable in the UAE and Saudi Arabia?

Both countries allow a non-compete in an employment contract, but both limit it. Summaries of the UAE's Federal Decree-Law No. 33 of 2021 describe a clause that must be written, tied to place, time and type of work, and capped at two years after the contract ends. Saudi Arabia's labour law is described as similar, with a two-year cap. Whether a particular clause holds depends on its wording, the employer's conduct and the court, so a board should take local legal advice.

Is garden leave the same as a non-compete?

No. Garden leave applies while the executive is still employed, during the notice period. A non-compete applies after employment has ended. A board can use both: garden leave to cover the notice period and a narrow, time-limited non-compete afterwards. They are separate terms and should be drafted separately.

What should a remuneration committee require instead of a long non-compete?

A notice period and garden leave matched to how sensitive the role is, within what local law allows; a narrow non-solicitation clause covering named clients, staff and partners; confidentiality terms; and deferred pay that stays at risk after the executive leaves, with clear leaver and recovery terms. JOH Partners' view is that money still at stake does more to hold an executive than a clause the board is unlikely to enforce.

Should a board enforce a non-compete in the Gulf?

Only if it has decided in advance that it will. Enforcement costs money, time and relationships, and the Gulf business community is small. A board that does not intend to sue should not rely on a clause that assumes it will, and should put its protection into terms it can apply without a court, such as notice, garden leave and deferred pay.

Author

Oliver Helvin

Founder and Managing Director

Oliver Helvin is the Founder and Managing Director of JOH Partners. He writes on the GCC executive market, leadership transitions in family-controlled businesses, and the discipline of senior search.

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